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The National Human Rights Commission of Korea, and North Korean Human Rights: 
A Law and Policy Analysis 
 
Abstract: This essay analyzes the appropriate role of the National Human Rights Commission of 
Korea in addressing North Korean human rights issues. It first addresses the legal question of 
whether the commission is permitted to document and raise awareness of North Korean human 
rights as a matter of both international law as well as domestic legal authorization. Then, the 
essay more broadly analyzes whether the commission is an appropriate body to engage North 
Korean human rights from a policy perspective, especially when compared with other potential 
loci for dealing with North Korean rights issues. It concludes that there is no legal barrier to the 
commission documenting and raising awareness of North Korean human rights, and, in certain 
respects, it is well suited to do so, although doing so would present certain dangers.  
Biographical Statement: Andrew Wolman received his J.D. from New York University School 
of Law and his LL.M. from the George Washington University Law School. He is currently an 
Associate Professor at the Graduate School of International Area Studies of Hankuk University 
of Foreign Studies, in Seoul, Korea, where he teaches courses in human rights and international 
law. He is a member of the New York State Bar, and formerly practiced as an associate with the 
law firm of White & Case, LLP. This essay was written while he was a POSCO fellow at the 
East-West Center. 
 
I. Introduction 
South Koreans are peculiarly affected by the dire human rights situation in North Korea. 
They oftentimes feel great sympathy for their ethnic brethren in the North, but attempts to 
address human rights practices in the North are complicated by security concerns as well as the 
widespread desire for closer relations and eventual unification. Over the past two decades, this 
has led to controversy regarding how the South Korean government should respond to North 
Korean human rights abuses. Much of this controversy has recently centered on the appropriate 
role of the National Human Rights Commission of Korea (NHRCK). In part, this is a byproduct 
of the continuing debate over the passage of a North Korean Human Rights Act. In some of the 
draft Acts proposed in recent years, the NHRCK would play a major role in documenting and 
publicizing North Korean abuses. In part, it is a result of increasing NHRCK activities on North 
Korean issues. Absent alternative legislative action in the area, the NHRCK has stepped forward 
of its own accord to assume a greater role in addressing North Korean human rights, primarily 
through its May 2011 establishment of the North Korea Human Rights Documentation Center 
and Archives. 
This essay will analyze the appropriate role of the NHRCK in addressing North Korean 
human rights issues. After some brief background on human rights in North Korea and the South 
Korean response, the essay will first address whether the NHRCK is legally permitted to engage 
in this North Korea-focused activity. This section of the essay will look at both potential 
international law prohibitions as well as questions of authorization under South Korea’s domestic 
legal framework. Then, the essay will more broadly analyze whether the NHRCK is an 
appropriate body to engage with North Korean human rights from a policy perspective. This 
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section will review other potential loci for dealing with North Korean rights issues before 
looking at the relative advantages and potential drawbacks of the NHRCK.  
II. Human Rights in North Korea  
 Over the past two decades, it has become abundantly clear that North Korea is the site of 
extraordinarily persistent and grave human rights abuses. As the U.N. High Commissioner of 
Human Rights, Navi Pillay, recently stated, “the deplorable human rights situation in DPRK … 
has no parallel anywhere else in the world.”1 Political freedoms are non-existent, and even mild 
criticism of the regime or its leadership can lead to imprisonment. Freedom of religion is also 
minimal, with Christians frequently being persecuted (an estimated 50,000 to 70,000 are 
currently held in prison camps).
2
 The state places heavy restrictions on freedom of movement 
within the country and prohibits unauthorized departures from the country. In addition, the North 
Korean criminal justice system is considered to be extremely harsh and lacking independence. 
Executions are authorized for a variety of ill-defined crimes, and observers have reported the 
existence of numerous public executions in recent years.
3
 Perhaps the signature evil of the North 
Korean regime is its system of six prison camps, where an estimated 200,000 individuals are 
confined in extraordinarily brutal conditions.
4
  
North Korea’s poor human rights record is not confined to the sphere of civil and 
political rights. In the realm of economic and social rights too, the population suffers severe 
deprivations. International attention in this respect is usually focused on the right to food. While 
conditions have improved since the great famine of the mid-late 1990s, periodic shortages still 
occur, with chronic malnutrition in many areas of the countryside.
5
 This dismal situation results 
in part from government mismanagement of the economy and a military-first policy that directs 
an inordinate proportion of the country’s resources to the armed forces.6 Thousands of North 
Koreans have escaped the desperate conditions of their home country, braving extreme dangers 
to reach China and eventually the safety of South Korea or other asylum countries.  
                                                          
1
 Press Release, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Pillay 
Urges More Attention to Human Rights Abuses in North Korea: Calls for International Inquiry 
(January 14, 2013),  available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=12923&LangID=E 
(last visited July 3, 2013). 
2
 Boris Kondoch, The Responsibility to Protect and Northeast Asia: The Case of North Korea, 24 
KOREAN J. OF DEF. ANALYSIS 433, 439 (2012). 
3
 Morse Tan, A State of Rightlessness: The Egregious Case of North Korea, 80 MISS. L. J. 681, 
703-04 (2010). 
4
 Press Release, Amnesty International, Images Reveal Scale of North Korean Political Prison 
Camps (May 3, 2011), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/images-reveal-
scale-north-korean-political-prison-camps-2011-05-03  (last visited July 3, 2013). 
5
 Diana Park, Surviving Food Insecurity in North Korea, 11 GEO. J. INT'L AFF. 133 (2010-2011). 
6
 Jason Strother, Defectors Link North Korea’s Weapons Program to Food Shortage, DEUTSCHE 
WELLE, Apr. 13, 2012, available at http://www.dw.de/defectors-link-north-koreas-weapons-program-to-
food-shortage/a-15880910 (last visited July 3, 2013). 
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While North Korea’s human rights abuses have been the subject of horror all over the 
world, they have had a particularly strong effect in South Korea, where complex sentiments of 
kinship and unity with the North Korean people mix with feelings of enmity against the Kim 
regime. Although most South Koreans strongly oppose the brutal human rights abuses of the 
North Korean government, there has been no unanimity on a response to those violations. On the 
contrary, there has for many years been a fairly rigid partisan divide on the question of what 
South Korea should say or do in response. Conservative politicians have generally favored 
harshly criticizing the North Korean human rights record. Some would argue that the 
conservative criticism has been principled, but others would claim that it is instrumental, with the 
aim of weakening and delegitimizing an ‘enemy’ state. Progressive leaders, on the other hand, 
for many years refrained from broaching North Korean human rights issues, because they believe 
that criticizing North Korea on human rights matters would needlessly antagonize the North’s 
leadership and make it more difficult to engage in cooperative activities that would eventually 
lead to unification.
7
 As will be detailed below, the NHRCK has since its establishment struggled 
to establish a role for itself in dealing with North Korean human rights abuses that are difficult to 
ignore but politically sensitive.  
III. Response from the National Human Rights Commission of Korea  
 The National Human Rights Commission of Korea was set up in 2001 with a mandate to 
“ensure the protection of the inviolable and fundamental human rights of all individuals and the 
promotion of the standards of human rights.”8 The NHRCK undertakes many types of tasks, 
including most notably the investigation of complaints of human rights violations and issuance 
of recommendations on the human rights implications of legislation and policies.
9
 The scope of 
the NHRCK’s mandate is relatively wide. According to its statute, ‘human rights’ are defined as 
“any rights and freedoms, including human dignity and worth, guaranteed by the Constitution 
and Acts of the Republic of Korea, recognized by international human rights treaties entered into 
and ratified by the Republic of Korea, or protected under international customary law.”10 In 
addition, the scope of its jurisdiction explicitly covers foreign residents, when they are located in 
                                                          
7
 See Hyo-Je Cho, Two Concepts of Human Rights in Contemporary Korea, in CONTEMPORARY 
SOUTH KOREAN SOCIETY: A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE 96, 102 (Hee Yeon Cho et al. eds., 2012). To 
a certain extent, however, this reluctance eroded in the latter part of the Roh Moo Hyun 
presidency; in 2004 and 2005, Korean ambassador to the U.N. Choi Hyeok expressed his 
concern over human rights conditions in the North, and in 2006 South Korea voted for the first 
time in favor of the U.N. General Assembly’s annual resolution condemning human rights 
abuses in the North. Keum-Soon Lee, South Korea’s Policy toward North Korea and North 
Korea’s Human Rights 419, International Symposium on Human Rights in North Korea, Seoul, 
Korea (November 30, 2006) (on file with author). 
8
 National Human Rights Commission Act of Republic of Korea - Act No. 6481, May 24, 2001 
(NHRCK Act), art. 1. 
9
 NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION OF KOREA, MANDATE AND JURISDICTION, at 
http://www.humanrights.go.kr/english/about_nhrck/mandate_01.jsp (last visited July 3, 2013).   
10
 NHRCK Act, supra note 8, art. 2(1). 
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the Republic of Korea, and Korean nationals wherever they may be.
11
 Perhaps the most 
significant attribute of the NHRCK is its independence from government control. As is the case 
with other national human rights institutions around Asia, the commission independently 
addresses those matters that fall within its purview.
12
   
From its earliest years, the NHRCK has naturally faced the question of whether it should 
actively address North Korean human rights, and, if so, how. During the first five years of its 
operation, a small policy group within the NHRCK researched North Korean rights issues and 
there were annual conferences on the subject.
13
 However, at that time, the NHRCK almost never 
expressed its opinion on issues related to North Korea. Perhaps its most high profile North 
Korea-related action in its early years was an April 2004 recommendation that the government 
enact a law to investigate the damages suffered by families of South Korean abductees to North 
Korea, and consider the payment of compensation to victims.
14
 Other similar opinions regarding 
abductees and their families were issued in 2006 and 2008.
15
  
In December 2006, the NHRCK made its first public step towards greater involvement 
with issues of North Korean rights when it released a policy statement on North Korea that 
recommended that the South Korean government “develop solidarity and vitalize cooperation 
with the international community in order to gain concrete improvements regarding North 
Korean human rights.”16 It also recommended that the government “pursue diplomatic efforts as 
a top priority, particularly with national authorities of countries where North Korean defectors 
are situated, in order to resolve the problem of forced repatriation”.17 While this clearly indicated 
a trend toward greater involvement, the NHRCK ensured that its recommendations were aimed 
at the South Korean government. It did not directly engage with North Korea (or China) and 
explicitly noted that North Korean human rights issues could not be part of its investigation 
mandate because of constitutional concerns.
18
  
After the December 2006 statement, the NHRCK became more active in issuing 
recommendations on some of the more sensitive aspects of North Korean human rights. In 2007, 
an official NHRCK delegation traveled to Mongolia, China, and Thailand in order to better grasp 
                                                          
11
 Id. at art. 4. 
12
 Id. at art. 3 
13
 Hyok-chol Kown, South Korea and Human Rights in North Korea, HANKYOREH 21 (April 24, 
2003). 
14
 NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION OF KOREA, 2012 COMPILATION OF HR VIOLATIONS 
412-13 (2012). 
15
 Id. 
16
 NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION OF KOREA, BASIC POSITION ON NORTH KOREAN 
HUMAN RIGHTS (Dec. 11, 2006). 
17
 Id. 
18
 Id. 
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the conditions faced by North Korean escapees in those countries.
19
 In August 2008, it issued a 
recommendation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade to intensify diplomatic efforts with 
the Chinese government aimed at ending the repatriation of North Korean defectors.
20
 In 
September 2008, a recommendation was issued that humanitarian food aid to North Korea be 
undertaken independently of political concerns.
21
 In 2008, organizational structures were first 
established to deal specifically with North Korean issues: an Inter-Governmental Agency 
Consultative Council (formed at NHRCK’s initiative). an Experts’ Forum on North Korean 
Human Rights, and a Special Committee on North Korean Human Rights.
22
  
A more forceful engagement with North Korean human rights issues did not occur until 
Lee Myung Bak appointed Hyun Byung-chul to be the commission’s new chairman in July 2009. 
Hyun was perceived as more conservative than his predecessors and has consistently expressed 
his desire to more actively address North Korean rights issues.
23
 In addition, President Lee 
clearly conveyed his desire at that time that the NHRCK concentrate more on North Korean 
violations (although the propriety of such guidance is questionable given the NHRCK’s 
independence from government control).
24
 This was followed in December 2010 by an NHRCK 
recommendation urging passage of a form of the North Korean Human Rights Act that would 
statutorily ensure the role of the NHRCK in documenting North Korean human rights. In late 
2011, the NHRCK then submitted a more comprehensive policy recommendation to the South 
Korean government on North Korean human rights, encompassing both the rights of North 
Koreans in North Korea as well as the rights of North Korean escapees and issues related to 
prisoners of war, abductees, and separated families.
25
 
While the North Korean Human Rights Act has not yet passed, on March 15, 2011, the 
NHRCK independently inaugurated the North Korea Human Rights Documentation Center & 
                                                          
19
 Press Release, National Human Rights Commission of Korea, Official Visit to Understand the 
Situation of North Korean Human Rights (March 27, 2008), available at 
http://www.humanrights.go.kr/english/activities/board_list.jsp (last visited July 3, 2013). 
20
 NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION OF KOREA, NORTH KOREAN HUMAN RIGHTS 5 (2012). 
21
 Id. 
22
 Id. at 6. 
23
 Yong Jae Mok, NK Human Rights Among Top Priorities, DAILYNK, June 21, 2011, available 
at http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk02500&num=7855 (last visited July 3, 2013). At 
one point Hyun went so far as to apologize for the previous passivity of the NHRCK with respect 
to North Korean rights issues. Human Rights Commissioner Apologizes to N. Korean Defectors, 
CHOSUN ILBO, May 12, 2011, available at 
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/05/12/2011051200970.html (last visited July 3, 2013). 
24
 Jeong-ju Na, Seoul Toughens Stance on N. Korean Rights, KOREA TIMES, July 20, 2009, 
available at http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2012/04/113_48791.html (last visited July 3, 
2013).  
25
 Press Release, National Human Rights Commission of Korea, NHRCK Submitted the National 
Policy Recommendation on North Korean Human Rights (December 7, 2011), available at 
http://www.humanrights.go.kr/english/activities/board_list.jsp (last visited July 3, 2013). 
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Archives. This center, which was ostensibly modeled after West Germany’s Salzgitter Center to 
record East German human rights violations, has been engaged in recording North Korean 
human rights violations, pursuant to complaints made by both victims (largely North Korean 
defectors settled in South Korea) and non-profit groups active in the field.
26
 The materials 
received by the center are intended to educate the public about human rights conditions in North 
Korea, inform governmental policy, and “provide grounds for the punishment of the violators of 
international laws and to warn them of punishment, consequently suppressing human rights 
infringements.”27 The establishment of this center was controversial within the South Korean 
government. There was no explicit statutory authorization for the NHRC to establish this center, 
and there were immediate objections from officials in the Ministry of Unification and Ministry of 
Justice who felt that their agencies were better suited to lead on North Korean human rights 
documentation.
28
  
IV. Legal Analysis 
The NHRCK’s shift in focus towards a greater emphasis on North Korean human rights 
has been controversial for a number of reasons. One criticism from some commentators has been 
that it would be a violation of international law for the South Korean government to actively 
address human rights violations in North Korea or would exceed the NHRCK’s mandate under 
Korean domestic law.
 29
 This section will analyze whether either of these is the case. 
A. International Law 
 Historically, international law has placed limits on the degree to which one sovereign 
state can interfere with the internal affairs of another sovereign state. This general norm of non-
interference is contained both in customary international law and has often been characterized as 
implicit in Articles 2.4 and 2.7 of the United Nations Charter.
30
 It is also reflected in numerous 
non-binding declarations adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, perhaps the most notable being 
the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
Operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and the 
                                                          
26
 Si-soo Park, Archive on NK Rights Marks First 100 Days, KOREA TIMES, June 21, 2011, 
available at http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/06/117_89350.html (last visited July 3, 
2013).  
27
 NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION OF KOREA, 2012 COMPILATION OF NORTH KOREAN 
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, preface (2012).  
28
 Jong Eun Lee, Bukingweongirokbojonso Yuchi Nohgo Ilbu Beommubu Ingweoneui 
Shingyeongjeon [Tension Between MOJ and NHRC Over North Korean Human Rights Archive], 
DONGA ILBO, March 16, 2011, available at http://news.donga.com/3/all/20110316/35604651/1 (last 
visited July 3, 2013). 
29
 Jang-Hie Lee, Understanding North Korean Human Rights Issues in the Aspect of 
International Law, in NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION OF KOREA, 2005 COMPILATION OF 
NORTH KOREAN HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 70 (2005). 
30
 Müge Kinacioğlu, The Principle of Non-Intervention at the United Nations: The Charter 
Framework and the Legal Debate, PERCEPTIONS 15, 38 (Summer 2005).  
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Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of 
States.
31
  
In order to ascertain whether the NHRCK’s work on North Korean human rights actually 
violates these broad non-interference duties, it is necessary to analyze, first, whether the 
NHRCK’s actions can be attributed to the Republic of Korea; second, whether the relationship 
between North and South Korea constitutes an international relationship governed by 
international law; third, whether the general non-interference principle encompasses the type of 
human rights actions being undertaken by the NHRCK; and fourth, whether there are any 
specific non-interference legal norms that could bind South Korea in the absence of a generally 
applicable prohibition. 
The first element of the analysis is relatively clear-cut. While independence has often 
been repeated as an important attribute of national human rights commissions, this should not 
disguise the fact that such commissions are evidently instruments of the state. Commissioners are 
state employees, and the NHRCK’s budget is regulated by the Ministry of Planning and Budget, 
and the Ministry of Public Administration and Security.
32
 In 2009, the Constitutional Court 
confirmed the NHRCK’s status as a state organ. 33  As noted in the Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, the “conduct of any State organ shall 
be considered an act of that State under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, 
executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the 
State.”34 While one can debate the terminology of whether or not the NHRCK should be called a 
‘governmental’ body, there is no doubt that it is an organ of the state, whose actions should 
therefore entail state responsibility. 
Given that the NHRCK’s actions can be attributed to the state, the next question is 
whether the relationship between South Korea and North Korea is ‘international’ and therefore 
regulated by international law. At the level of domestic law, the Korean Constitution is quite 
clear that the South Korean state encompasses the entire Korean peninsula.
35
 In addition, the 
1991 Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation 
                                                          
31
 See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 
2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/8028 (Dec. 17, 1970); Declaration on the Inadmissibility of 
Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States, G.A. Res. 36/103, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/36/103 (Dec. 9, 1981). 
32
 ASIAN NGOS NETWORK ON NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, 2008 REPORT ON THE PERFORMANCE 
AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS IN ASIA 16 (2008), available at 
http://archive.forum-asia.org/in_the_news/pdfs/ANNI2008web.pdf (last visited July 3, 2013). 
33
 Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 2009 Hun-Ra6, Oct. 28, 2010, (22-2 KCCR, 1) (S. Kor.). 
34
 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts in Report of the 
International Law Commission, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001), art. 4.1. 
35
 Constitution of the Republic of Korea, adopted 17 July 1948 (last amended 1987), art. 3 
(“[t]he territory of the Republic of Korea shall consist of the Korean peninsula and its adjacent 
islands”). 
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characterizes inter-Korean relations as “not being a relationship as between states,” but instead 
“a special one constituted temporarily in the process of unification.”36 This “special” relationship 
sometimes takes on quasi-international law attributes for practical reasons; for example, the four 
inter-Korean economic cooperation agreements signed in December 2000 were eventually 
forwarded to the National Assembly for its consent as if they were treaties.
37
 The South Korean 
government continues to maintain, however, that the relationship between North and South 
Korea is not like a relationship between states.
38
 This consistent insistence means that, at the 
domestic level, South Korean actions toward the North are, at least in theory, considered to be 
covered by domestic law, rather than international law.  
However, it is equally clear that international law as a system is not controlled by 
characterizations made in the South Korean Constitution, and that an internationally wrongful act 
can therefore not be excused by the fact that it was not ‘international’ under a state’s domestic 
laws.
39
 Therefore, the pertinent question is whether both North and South Korea are separate 
states, and therefore separate subjects of international law. Here, the answer is an uncontroversial 
“yes.” International lawyers have developed two main ways of assessing statehood: the 
constitutive approach, which bases statehood upon recognition by other members of the 
international community, and the (dominant) declaratory approach, which bases statehood on the 
fulfillment of certain objective criteria.
40
 If one takes the constitutive approach, it is indisputable 
that North Korea has achieved sufficient recognition to be considered an international subject, 
given its membership in the United Nations and recognition as a sovereign by all states save 
South Korea and Japan. If one uses the declaratory approach, then a cursory glance is all that is 
needed to show that North Korea possesses a permanent population, a defined territory (the 
existence of border disputes being irrelevant for this purpose), a government, and the capacity to 
enter into relations with the other states, thus fulfilling the classic ‘declaratory’ criteria for 
statehood outlined in Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of 
States.
41
   
Next is the question of whether the general non-interference principle encompasses a 
prohibition on the type of North Korea-related human rights work undertaken by the NHRCK, 
                                                          
36
 Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation,  
preamble (1991). 
37
 Seong-Ho Jhe, Four Major Agreements on Inter-Korean Cooperation and Legal Measures for 
their Implementation, 5 J. KOREAN L. 126, 131 (2005). 
38
 Id. at 132. 
39
 See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts in Report of 
the International Law Commission, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001), art. 3; 1969 Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, art. 27, 1155 UNTS 331. 
40
 See MARTIN DIXON, INTERNATIONAL LAW 127-28 (2007). 
41
 Convention on Rights and Duties of States, 1933, art. 1, LNTS, vol. 165, 19. While neither 
North Korea nor South Korea is  party to this convention, the criteria for statehood contained 
therein are often cited as the traditional requirements of the ‘declarative’ theory of statehood. 
DAVID RAIČ, STATEHOOD AND THE LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 24 (2002). 
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specifically the accepting and recording of complaints of North Korean human rights violations. 
North Korean governmental representatives have claimed that this is the case, although they do 
not couch their non-interference objections in explicitly legal terms.
 42
 In fact, prior to 1945, 
human rights were – at least according to some commentators – considered to be part of the 
internal affairs of a sovereign nation.
43
 However, this changed with the United Nations Charter 
and the post-World War II development of international human rights law. Today, human rights 
are generally accepted as being of more than just a domestic matter that can be hidden behind a 
shield of sovereignty.
44
 
There are, of course, limits to the extent of interference that is legitimate based on human 
rights abuses. There is much debate, for example, regarding the legality of military intervention 
to prevent a government from engaging in massive human rights abuses, and the majority view is 
probably still that the use of force in such circumstances is illegal absent Security Council 
authorization.
45
 It is also sometimes noted that human rights cannot be used as an excuse to exert 
pressure on other states or create disorder among states.
46
 However, it is now accepted that 
documenting and publicizing human rights abuses, as the NHRCK has been engaged in, is 
permissible and indeed common at the United Nations and foreign capitals around the world.
47
 
As the preceding analysis demonstrates, the NHRCK’s North Korea-related work would 
not violate the general international law principle of non-interference. However, it is also worth 
asking whether there are any specific non-interference norms binding South Korea’s actions 
towards North Korea. In fact, in the 1972 South-North Joint Communiqué, South and North 
Korea each declared their intention to “cultivate an atmosphere of mutual trust between North 
                                                          
42
 Many states accused of human right violations, including North Korea, contend that such 
accusations constitute interference with their internal affairs. DAVID HAWK, PURSUING PEACE 
WHILE ADVANCING RIGHTS: THE UNTRIED APPROACH TO NORTH KOREA 59 (2010). 
43
 Heewon Han, Newly Arising Issues on the Limitation of Intervention Law and Refugees under 
the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004, 1 ATOMS FOR PEACE: AN INT’L JOURNAL 355, 362 
(2007). 
44
 Danilo Türk, Reflections on Human Rights, Sovereignty of States, and the Principle of Non-
Intervention, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE FOR THE DOWNTRODDEN 758 (Morten 
Bergsmo ed., 2003). 
45
 See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 710-12 (6th ed., 2003); 
Antonio Cassese, Ex Iniuria Ius Oritur: Are We Moving Toward International Legitimation of 
Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?, 10 EURO. J. INT.L L. 23, 23-
30 (1999). 
46
 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of 
States, G.A. Res. 36/103, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/103 (Dec. 9, 1981). 
47
 See, e.g., Maziar Jamnejad & Michael Wood, Current Legal Developments – The Principle of 
Non-intervention, 22 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 345, 376 (2009) (“what should be (and largely is) 
uncontested is that states and international organizations are entitled to criticize the human rights 
situation in other countries”). 
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and South by refraining from vilifying the other side.” 48  This was echoed by the 2007 
Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity, which 
states that “[t]he South and the North have agreed not to interfere in the internal affairs of the 
other”49 and that “[t]he South and the North have agreed not to antagonize each other.”50 Thus, 
the anti-vilification language of the 1972 Joint Communiqué clearly goes beyond what general 
international law requires, reflecting North Korea’s particular sensitivities on this matter. It is not 
clear, however, whether such clauses would cover the type of human rights statements that have 
emanated from the NHRCK; such would be a matter of interpretation. More importantly, 
however, the joint declarations can in no way be seen as binding treaty provisions under 
international law. Fundamentally, international law accepts as treaties all agreements between 
states that are governed by international law.
51
 Yet it is clear that the joint declarations between 
the North and South were not intended to be governed by international law. First, neither side 
recognizes the other as a sovereign; second, they are not characterized as treaties by the parties 
or ratified by the South Korean parliament; and, third, the relevant parties have explicitly 
underlined their non-international law nature.
52
 
B. Domestic Law 
 While there is no international law obstacle to the NHRCK documenting complaints 
relating to human rights violations in North Korea and publicizing abuses, that does not mean 
that they are authorized to do so under South Korea’s domestic legal framework. Under South 
Korea’s domestic system, the powers of the NHRCK are established in the National Human 
Rights Commission Act. Regarding the Act’s scope of application, Article 4 states that the Act 
“shall apply to all citizens of the Republic of Korea and all foreigners residing therein.” 53 As an 
initial matter, it is therefore necessary to establish whether North Koreans are in fact “citizens of 
the Republic of Korea.”  
This seemingly absurd question is in fact a source of some debate. As mentioned, the 
South Korean Constitution considers the territory of the Republic of Korea to consist of the 
entire Korean peninsula.
54
 Meanwhile, South Korea’s Nationality Act specifies that a “person 
whose father or mother is a national of the Republic of Korea at the time of a person’s 
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birth…shall be a national of the Republic of Korea at birth”55 Thus, both scholars and courts 
have accepted that, in principle, provided an individual born in North Korea is not descended 
from two foreign (non-North or South Korean) parents, he or she should be considered – from 
birth – to be a South Korean national.56 This being the case, Article 4 of the NHRCK Act must 
be interpreted to apply to North Koreans.  
While the general scope of the NHRCK Act would apply to North Koreans, it is 
important to note that this general applicability may not apply to the NHRCK’s duty of 
“investigation and remedy with respect to human rights violations.”57 This is because petitions 
alleging human rights violations can only be investigated and remedied if human rights 
“guaranteed in Articles 10 through 22 of the Constitution are violated by the performance of 
duties (excluding the legislation of the National Assembly and the trial of a court or the 
Constitutional Court) of state organs, local governments or detention or protective facilities.”58 
The reference to “state organs, local governments or detention or protective facilities” has 
normally been interpreted to refer to organs of the South Korean state (although the language 
does leave some room for interpretation as to whether North Korean government organs should 
also be considered “state organs”).  
While it may not therefore be permissible for the NHRCK to investigate and remedy 
complaints regarding North Korean human rights, it is worth stressing that such actions have not 
been undertaken by the NHRCK so far. In fact, these actions would be relatively unrealistic 
given the difficulty of investigating discreet violations in North Korea and the impossibility of 
obtaining an individualized remedy from the North Korean government. To date, the NHRCK 
has essentially been involved in documentation and awareness-raising activities, which can 
comfortably be situated within the NHRCK’s other mandated duties, namely to survey human 
rights conditions,
59
 raise public awareness of human rights,
60
 and undertake other measures 
necessary to protect and improve human rights.
61
 These activities are not limited to rights abuses 
by state bodies, and, in fact, the NHRCK has engaged in a significant amount of work on rights 
abuses by non-state actors, and especially by corporations.
62
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V. Institutional Analysis 
Although it would be legal for the NHRCK to record North Korean human rights 
violations, that does not necessarily mean that it would be wise for it to do so. In general, 
national human rights commissions in other countries have avoided addressing human rights 
abuses beyond their borders. For example, in the Universal Periodic Reviews at the United 
Nations Human Rights Council, national human rights commissions often comment on the 
human rights record in their own state, but they refrain from speaking out in discussions of other 
states (even though they are permitted to do so).
63
 The only significant exception to this rule 
elsewhere is cases where the home state or a home state national has committed a human rights 
violation outside the state’s borders.64 In addition, there are certainly alternative institutional loci 
within South Korea which could alternatively play the leading role in recording North Korean 
human rights violations and raising public awareness of said violations. The next section will 
briefly discuss these other alternatives, and the following section will analyze the attributes the 
NHRCK can bring to the table when compared with these other bodies. 
A. Other Institutional Possibilities 
Realistically, there are three other divisions of the South Korean government that could 
plausibly take the lead role in recording and raising awareness of North Korean human rights: 
the Ministry of Unification (MOU); the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), and the National Intelligence 
Service (NIS). Each of these could in turn act either directly or through a subsidiary foundation. 
These possibilities will be discussed in turn. 
As regards North Korean human rights the most widely discussed agency alternative to 
the NHRCK is the MOU. The MOU generally takes the lead in inter-Korean negotiations, and 
has previously been involved in compiling records of North Korean human rights abuses through 
the Korean Institute for National Unification. The MOU would bring certain advantages to North 
Korean human rights documentation tasks. Most notably, it has experience in human rights work 
through the Center for North Korean Human Rights Studies, which was created by the Korean 
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Institute for National Unification (KINU) in December 1994. KINU is the major government-
sponsored think tank on North Korean issues, and is affiliated with the MOU. Since 1996, the 
Center for North Korean Human Rights Studies has produced annual White Papers on human 
rights in North Korea, compiled in large part with the assistance of the non-profit Database 
Center for North Korean Human Rights. The MOU also has certain disadvantages. Human rights 
are not central to MOU’s mandate, and it has a reputation of not wanting to strongly address 
rights, presumably out of a worry that doing so would complicate negotiations on inter-Korean 
cooperation and eventual unification.
65
 
The MOJ is another alternative that has been frequently discussed for dealing with North 
Korean human rights. MOJ has experience with human rights issues through its Human Rights 
Bureau, which contains four separate divisions: the Human Rights Policy Division, the Human 
Rights Support Division, the Human Rights Investigation Division, and the Women and 
Children’s Policy Team. 66  Among other tasks, the Human Rights Investigation Division 
monitors and investigates possible human rights violation in the course of law enforcement 
activities and performs inspections of detention facilities. The skill set involved in these activities 
could presumably be used to document complaints regarding North Korean human rights. At 
least arguably, the Supreme Prosecutors Office (SPO) under MOJ could also undertake 
investigations, but the SPO has no direct expertise in human rights issues, has long been heavily 
criticized for its politically biased prosecutions, and is seen by much of the public as a bastion of 
conservative political power.
67
  
The last government body that is worth mentioning is the NIS. It may seem absurd on 
first glance for the NIS to take on this role, as the NIS previously had  a distinctly anti-human 
rights reputation (and still does among some today).
68
 However, the NIS naturally has the best 
access to intelligence about events actually taking place in North Korea. NIS is also the lead 
agency in interviewing North Korean escapees who make it to the South, giving it an opportunity 
to inquire about human rights abuses and receive complaints. On the other hand, NIS is poorly 
suited for playing the public role that would be necessary to raise awareness about North Korean 
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human rights issues due to its emphasis on secrecy, the suspicion with which it is viewed by 
segments of the Korean populace, and the fact that human rights promotion and protection are 
not generally part of its mandate.  
B. Advantages and Disadvantages of the NHRCK 
 When compared with the other plausible institutional loci for addressing North Korean 
human rights, the NHRCK possesses certain important advantages. Perhaps its greatest 
advantage is its considerable experience in accepting human rights complaints and in human 
rights promotion. From its founding in 2001 until December 31, 2011, it received a total of 
58,672 human rights complaints, along with 137,308 counseling cases and 201,468 civic 
petitions or inquiries.
69
 While there are fundamental differences between the process of dealing 
with human rights complaints from South Korea and those that took place in North Korea, the 
NHRCK’s twelve years of experience in the area of human rights protection should provide it 
with institutional knowledge that would also assist in dealing with North Korean violations. 
While other agencies such as MOJ and MOU have some experience dealing with rights, none of 
them has the same level of expertise. 
Another area where the NHRCK stands out is in its level of independence from political 
control. Unlike government agencies, national human rights commissions are in principle not 
supposed to take instructions from the government, and, while this is not always the case in 
practice, at least until recently the NHRCK received good marks in this regard.
70
 In fact, there 
have been many instances of the NHRCK taking positions contrary to the desires of the 
administration in power. For example, during the recent Lee Myung Bak administration, the 
NHRCK called for an end to the National Security Act. In previous progressive administrations, 
the NHRCK also publicly clashed with the sitting government, perhaps most notably by stating 
its opposition to South Korea’s involvement in the Iraq War and asserting that its commissioners 
did not have to follow government travel restrictions.
71
 Unfortunately, however, many observers 
claim that this autonomy was eroded during the Lee Myung Bak administration, and it is as yet 
uncertain how the commission will fare under a Park Geun Hye administration.
72
 Given the 
strong partisan divide over North Korean human rights issues, this independence from political 
control is probably beneficial to establishing the credibility of any findings on North Korean 
rights issues. It may also arguably provide the ancillary benefit of allowing the South Korean 
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leaders to plausibly deny responsibility for any findings that would upset the North Korean 
regime, in order to avoid retaliation.  
A final advantage of the NHRCK would be the greater credibility of its findings in the 
eyes of the public, both inside and outside of Korea. In part, this credibility would be a product 
of the commission’s independence from government control, but, beyond that, it would also be 
assisted by the fact that the NHRCK has a membership that is pluralistic by both law and custom. 
The commission is statutorily required to include at least four women.
73
 In recent years, it has 
also included a Buddhist priest, and a mix of lawyers, academics, and activists. On the 
international level, the NHRCK’s credibility is supported by its A-grade accreditation from the 
International Coordinating Committee of National Instruments for the Promotion and Protection 
of Human Rights, which indicates compliance with the U.N.-endorsed Paris Principles relating to 
the status of national institutions.  
One potential danger of using the NHRCK to address North Korean human rights would 
be the possibility that the NHRCK’s core competency of protecting and promoting South Korean 
human rights could suffer from a greater emphasis on North Korean affairs. Additional funds 
spent on North Korean issues means less money for protecting and promoting South Korean 
human rights, and additional staff working on North Korean issues could mean less manpower 
for domestic South Korean projects. Of course, the government could increase the overall budget 
to reflect the expanded mandate, but the recent conservative Lee Myung Bak administration in 
fact took the opposite tack, cutting the NHRCK budget and staff considerably at the same time 
that it was increasing work on North Korean issues.
74
 Any decreased emphasis on South Korean 
rights by the NHRCK would certainly be a very negative outcome, not only due to the great 
potential of the NHRCK to improve the many human rights problems in the South, but also 
because neglecting South Korean issues would decrease the organization’s credibility when 
promoting North Korean rights.  
Another potential danger of NHRCK involvement in North Korean affairs would be the 
potential of North Korean issues leading to political interference in the NHRCK’s independence. 
North Korean issues are among the most sensitive matters that the South Korean government 
deals with and fundamentally affect the country’s security outlook, economic growth, as well as 
its core ideological concerns. Thus, there is always the possibility that the government may at 
some point instruct the NHRCK to focus its attention on a particular human rights issue, or to 
ignore some other potential issue, in order to further the greater public interest in stability or 
security. Such interference would be disastrous to the NHRCK’s domestic and international 
reputation and should be avoided. 
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Both of these dangers can be avoided, however, by a presidential administration that is 
willing to value human rights in both North and South Korea, as well as respect the 
independence of the NHRCK. It is too early to know whether that will be the case with the 
incoming Park Geun Hye administration, but one can predict that she will at a minimum show 
more respect for the NHRCK than did Lee Myung Bak, who even before taking office had 
expressed a desire to end the commission’s independence.75 If the Park administration is in fact 
willing to support the NHRCK and avoid improper meddling, then there is no reason why it 
should not play a prominent role in documenting and raising awareness of North Korean human 
rights abuses. 
VI. Conclusion 
 As the foregoing analysis shows, there is no barrier in either international law or 
domestic South Korean law to the NHRCK’s documenting and raising awareness of North 
Korean human rights issues. The policy question of whether the NHRCK is the most sensible 
part of the Korean government to be engaging in these tasks is a more difficult question. The 
NHRCK certainly shows some comparative advantages in relation to other agencies that could 
possibly engage in these tasks. For example, its institutional independence can be seen as a 
benefit because it reduces the likelihood of over-politicization (a particular danger in North 
Korea-related issues) and allows for the credible denial of responsibility by political leaders who 
might want to negotiate with North Korean representatives regarding other issues without being 
seen as guilty of insulting the dignity of the North Korean state through their human rights work. 
The NHRCK has also developed a comparative expertise in the work of human rights monitoring 
and the application of international human rights standards, and is generally viewed as a highly 
credible institution.  
On the other hand, by concentrating on North Korean issues, the NHRCK could 
potentially lose focus from its primary goal of promoting and protecting human rights in South 
Korea, and its engagement in such a critical policy area could eventually put the commission’s 
independence at risk. These potential dangers could be avoided by a conscientious administration 
that raises the NHRCK’s budget and staffing to reflect its new responsibilities, and respects the 
commission’s independence. Overall, the potential drawbacks are outweighed by the advantages 
that the NHRCK brings to the table. 
It should be stressed, however, that this analysis has focused on documentation and 
awareness-raising activities, which are among the most important ways in which the South 
Korean government has chosen to address North Korean human rights. They are not, however, 
the only tools in the South Korean government’s arsenal. United Nations condemnation and 
investigation of North Korean human rights is increasingly important, and South Korea has the 
potential to help formulate a concerted global response, whether vocally or simply by providing 
behind the scenes leadership. This would evidently be part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade’s competency, where the NHRCK can play only a very limited role. MOJ, also, may have 
a future role in prosecuting human rights abusers, something that NHRCK is not equipped to do. 
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Although different agencies may have important roles in addressing North Korean human rights 
issues, this analysis has demonstrated that the role of the NHRCK is potentially valuable when it 
comes to documentation and awareness-raising, and that, as long as certain precautions are taken, 
legal and policy objections to its work are misguided. 
 
